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ABSTRACT
In this thesis we review three case studies in multimodal logistics and transportation
systems and analyze the reasons that lead to failure or success. We present the business
idea and model of each case study and study the factors that determine revenues and
costs, as well as the expectations of the case regarding the evolution of these factors in
the future. We observe the ex post behavior of the project and explain which module of
the business (revenues, costs, management) performed better or worse than expected.
This analysis will help managers, investors and primarily the venture capital industry
understand the main reasons of failure or success behind a business story and reveal some
hidden factors, which may crucially determine the outcome of the business.
We will perform our analysis qualitatively, identifying which part of the model
(revenues, costs) had the biggest impact on the divergence between expected profits and
what actually happened.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Henry S. Marcus
Title: Professor of Marine Systems
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Chapter 1
1.1 Introduction - Description
This thesis will help managers, investors and primarily the venture capital industry
understand the main reasons of failure or success behind a business story and reveal some
hidden factors, which may crucially determine the outcome of the business. According to
a Professor of MIT almost 95% of the new companies fail. This means that venture
capitalists and generally investors should be skeptical before placing their money in a
new idea.
This study will present four business plans in the field of multimodal logistics and
transportation systems and study the factors that determine revenues and costs, as well as
the expectations of the case regarding the evolution of these factors in the future. In
addition, it will identify whether there are discrepancies between the projected figures
and the actual. The next step will be to explain which module of the business (revenues,
costs, management) performed better or worse than expected. Each of these case studies
will be placed on a profit flow diagram.
The analysis will be performed qualitatively, identifying which part of the model
(revenues, costs) had the biggest impact on the divergence between expected profits and
what actually happened.
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1.2 Structure of the thesis
In this chapter the very first paragraphs presented the definition of the problem and the
scope of the study. The following will show the layout of the whole thesis.
In Chapter 2 there will be a presentation of a shipping company specializing in dry bulk
cargo, trying to raise money in order to invest in new buildings or second hand vessels.
The company tries to take advantage basically from the cyclicality of the shipping
industry.
Chapter 3 deals with a Greek company, which is involved in the refrigerated warehousing
as well as the production of ice. The company tries to gain a subsidy from the
government so as to renovate the building and improve the operation of the company.
This company wants to take advantage from the legislation preventing other companies
entering the market as well as its strategic location.
Chapter 4 presents a Greek company trying to invest in the seaplane industry in Greece.
The company tried to take advantage from the Olympic Games in 2004 in Greece and
launch their idea in order to move tourists, athletes and VIP's faster from one place to
another, have some sightseeing etc; since the tourism in Greece at that year was high. In
11
addition they believe that seaplanes will be an efficient, safe and fast way for someone to
visit the islands.
At this point I would like to mention that the real names of the companies will not be
shown for privacy reasons.
Finally, in the first section of Chapter 5, we will explain where does profitability and
performance come from. The second (and last) part there will an evaluation of where did
profitability (or loss) as well as good performance or bad performance occur for each of
the companies presented in the previous chapters. Finally there will be a presentation of
the major factors influencing for the success or failure of the companies.
LA
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Chapter 2
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CASE STUDY 1
(Thin2s were much better than expected)
Table of Contents:
2.1 Brief history of the company and its aspirations
2.2 Dry Bulk Market Overview
2.2.1 The Assets -
2.2.2 Demand
2.2.2.i Steel
2.2.2.ii Iron ore
2.2.2.iii Coal
2.2.2.ix Grain
2.2.3 Supply
2.2.4 Market Overview - Outlook
2.3 Company Group 1 (Shipping Company)
2.4 Considerations for Partnerships with Company 1
2.5 Investment Opportunity
2.6 Liquidation Options and Exit Strategies
2.7 The Deal: What did actually happen?
In this case, a shipping company, namely Company 1, which is involved in the
shipping industry for about 25 years, is planning to further expand its presence into
the market for cape - sized and panamax - sized vessels. Company 1 is aiming to
raise money in order to invest in new buildings or modern vessels (second hand
vessels). The business idea is based on the anticipation of the current supply/demand
imbalance, which combined with improved trade growth and the new regulations
introduced in 2001, will lead to a substantial increase in freight rates and asset
values (commencing in the year 2002). This is also based on the assumption of
underlying cyclicality in the shipping industry and the historically very low levels
that were prevailing at this point in the market.
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2.1 Brief history of the company and its aspirations
Company 1 is a shipping company, which was established by XX in 1977 for the
management and operation of bulk carriers, car/bulk, as well as bulk cement carriers for
world - wide trading. Company 1 has an extensive experience throughout all these years
in the shipping industry. During these 25 years, Company 1 has gone through many
stories, which gave them the opportunity to capitalise its retained earnings, and increase
its capital. Company 1 has expanded its equity base by 4 times from 1997 to 2001.
The company currently owns a fleet of 25 cargo vessels (ranging from 40,000 dwt to
170,000 dwt in size, with total tonnage of 2.15 million dwt), making the company one of
the largest in the world. Company 1 believes that the dry bulk carrier vessel is the most
secure and efficient mode for the transportation of dry bulk homogeneous cargoes.
It is estimated that the company has the capacity to operate an average of 50 vessels. The
company is located in Greece; however, it has offices in many other countries. Company
1 has displayed an ability to take advantage of the cyclicality of asset prices in this
industry and unique insight in focusing on different segments:
- Cement product transportation (Middle East -
Africa)(70's and 80's)
e Car transportation (Japan - USA) (70's - 80's)
* Grain cargo (late 80's)
- Coal trade (late 90's)
15
Additionally, Company 1 has established long lasting relationships with several majors
charterers A, B, C, D (these are very well known). High quality services standards made
the company a preferable operator, even in difficult market conditions.
Company's fleet has considerable potential to create attractive returns to shareholders
when exiting the market (expected to occur during the next peak forecasted for
2004/2005). This is because (see figure 1):
e Acquisitions have been made for rock bottom market prices
* The fleet is young which results in above the market, productivity fleet
* Management's performance has historically overperformed the market.
FIGURE 1: Secondhand Bulk Carriers (5 years old) - Values and Newbuilding Bulk
Carriers - Contract Price
Secondhand Bulk Carriers (5Y old) - Values (sourceSS'y Newbuilding Bulk Carriers - Contract Pice (source:SSY)
-0 0-
EQUITY RAISED $35M Investment Investment in EQUITY RAISED $25M Investment Investment
4rth Quarter 1999 in 3 Second hand 2 NIB Capes 4rth Quarter 2000 in N/B 
in 2 N/B
vessels1 0, 2000 4" 0. 1999 resale CapesPanamax 1 0 2002
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Shipping as an industry is characterised by a high degree of cyclicality due to low
variable costs and sensitivity to economic and competitive pressures. Following a
strategy of investing at the bottom of the market cycle, Company 1 has achieved very
good returns from investments in cape, panamax and handymax sized vessels (see figure
2). When this business plan was drafted (2002), the shipping market had fallen to a level
that was capable of attracting opportunity for investment. While asset values were
expected to fluctuate, they were expected to remain at or around current levels at least for
the next six months (ie through September 2002).
FIGURE 2: Shipping Market Cycle and Dry Bulk Market Cycles
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The supply side (active merchant fleet tonnage in the market) is the key determinant for
the movement of freight. When vessels exit the market or vessels enter lay up, market
conditions improve; whereas newbuilding activity and increased days on sea increase
supply and the market enters a recession. There will be opportunities for good second
hand sales and interest in modem panamax and cape sized units as buyers feel that value
is returning to these areas.
From the second half of 2002 onwards, Company 1 in line with other independent
analysts, expected rates to rise fuelled by intense scrapping in 2002, lack of pending new
orders in the second half of the year and traditionally stronger seasonal demand
throughout autumn and winter. Industry forecasts foresaw an increase in dry bulk trade of
2.4% in 2004, mainly due to continued high growth in China. Thermal coal trade in
particular was expected to remain strong with a growth rate of 3.7% forecasted for 2002.
The outlook foresaw sustained growth in both Chinese steel output and iron ore imports.
Moreover, estimates for healthy 2002/2003 grain in South and North America and
potential for demand rises in coarse grain, paved the way for longer term improvement.
The growth in grain trade was expected to improve prospects for recovery once the
industrial cycle turned.
The relation between new vessels on order and the existing active fleet also pointed to a
high probability of recovery for asset values. The dry bulk order book stood at 8.9% of
18
the existing fleet, compared to twelve months earlier when it stood at 17% of the fleet.
This is a positive development especially if one considers that pre - 1977 and 1977/1981
built vessels represented a level of 6.5% and 12.7% of the existing fleet respectively.
New class regulations made the continued operation of vessels built between 1975 and
1979 increasingly difficult and financially unattractive. Company 1 expected much of the
capacity built during these years to be offloaded over the coming thirty six months,
further enhancing the attractiveness of more recently built vessels.
Supply fundamentals were expected to remain very positive for owners for the following
reasons:
- The Wet (tankers) and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carrier order book was
facing rapid expansion and given the age structure of the existing fleet, it was
expected to contribute to new ordering activity for this type of vessels, thereby
occupying new building berths, that could otherwise have been allocated to dry
cargo vessels.
- There was a lack of available new building berths for cape sized vessels for the
next 2-3 years (2002 - 2005) resulting in a constraint for the further short term
cape sized fleet increases.
- Starting in 2005 the company expected a massive exit of single hull tanker vessels
in the Wet sector, due to the fact that they cannot meet the new IMO/EC rules
(double hull) and regulations (implemented following the ERICA disaster). This
19
would accentuate the rush for orders for this type of vessels again occupying any
available berth.
For the above aforementioned reasons the business plans firmly foresaw asset prices to
continuously increase for the period 2002 - 2005 with a peak during 2004 - 2005.
2.2 The market overview
There are three predominant sizes in the dry bulk sector. The panamax, the cape and the
handymax.
2.2.1 The Assets
- The panamax can be described as a vessel ranging from 60 - 80,000 tons dead -
weight gearless (no cranes) vessel. The name derives from the fact that this size of
vessel is limited by the maximum allowed dimensions of the locks at the Panama
Canal (i.e. 32.2 meters wide). This type of vessel may carry all bulk cargoes and
because of its practicality and efficiency most dry bulk parcels come at this size.
As a result it has become the workhorse of the dry bulk marine transportation.
- The cape is a vessel from 80,000 tons dead - weight and over. A cape is any
vessel too large to pass through the Panama Canal and in trading from the West to
the East will have to sail via the Cape of Good Hope. Hence the name Cape. The
size of the cape vessel made the greatest changes through the years as a result of
20
the increase in the parcels and the demand for dry homogeneous bulk cargoes
such as coal and ore. The predominant designs started at 110,000 tdwt and grew
to 130,000 tdwt to 145,000 tdwt to 160,000 and today to 170,000 tdwt. The
increase has followed and is restricted by the facilities and dimensions of ports
(terminals) handling these cargoes. The predominant size of today of 170,000
tdwt is by far the most efficient and economic vehicle to serve the steel and
energy industries.
Handymax are vessels from 45 - 50,000 tons dead weight vessels equipped with
25 - 30 ton capacity cranes. The handymax was named after its capacity to carry a
great variety of cargoes and trade into the remotest and underequipped port. This
size and type of vessel started off in the mid to late 70's at close to 20,000 tdwt.
Through the years the handymax grew in size as the predominant parcels of cargo
increased.
2.2.2 Demand
There is a dynamic relationship between sea trade and economic growth. The demand for
shipping capacity is primarily determined by the demand for the commodities carried,
and by the distance that these commodities will have to be carried by sea. Demand for
commodities is affected by, among other things, world and regional economics and
political conditions, environmental concerns, weather patterns, canal closures and
changes in seaborne and other transportation patterns and crop yields.
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In this industry demand is derived from the demand for trade and is relatively freight rate
inelastic, as transportation cost is only a very small fraction of the total cost of the value
of the cargo transported.
Major dry bulk cargoes,
support:
* Steel industry
-Iron ore
-Coking coal
representing almost 80% of the total seaborne dry bulk trade,
- Power generation industry
-Steam coal
- Food and feedstuff industry
-Grain
2.2.2.i Steel
World steel production was forecasted to grow from 822 million tones in 2001 to 888
million tones in 2005. Much of this growth would be driven by China. Outlook remained
for sustained growth in both Chinese steel output and iron ore imports. China domestic
economy continued to grow, there were investments in new ore import facilities and
22
finally there was a scope for steel import substitution. It was estimated that steel
production of China would rise to 175 mt in 2002.
2.2.2.ii Iron ore
Demand for iron ore imports is driven by steel production and by the construction of
infrastructure projects. Much shall depend upon from whom and from where the Chinese
buy their ore. If replacement of European by Australian suppliers, then tonne mile
demand could fall. If replacement of European by Brazilian suppliers, then tonne mile
demand could rise.
2.2.2.iii Coal
Japanese steam coal trade hit new heights. The estimated 6 mt rise in 2001 was one of the
largest annual increases on record and maintained an unbroken sequence of rises dating
back to 1987. The year's increase was based on a rising share of power generation
through the introduction of new capacity. The beneficiaries of increased Japanese coal
imports have been Australia, the former Soviet Union, Indonesia, and China. With
domestic coal production cease and additional new coal - fired electricity generating
capacity scheduled to come on stream in 2002, the outlook was for further increases in
Japanese imports next year.
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2.2.2.ix Grain
Predictions for increased exports for 2001/2002 trade year came from the International
Grains Council (IGC) and US. Depart of Agriculture (USDA). Plus sustained high levels
of US Soya cargoes, expected to generate much needed employment. China was facing a
steep fall in corn exports in 2001/2002. The resulting shortfall was expected to be
substituted by US exports that would increase tonne miles demand. Additionally, very
strong performance for US soya was driven by East Asia. SSY estimated a new full year
export record of 34 - 35 mt. USDA anticipated another 34 mt of exports for 2001/2002
(Oct/Sep) soya season. Finally, China would be the main destination for US exports. SSY
projected 5 mt annual growth for US exports over next 9 months, with shipments picking
up sharply in the 4 thquarter.
2.2.3 Supply
The supply of shipping capacity, measured by the amount of suitable tonnage available to
carry cargo was determined by the size of the active existing fleet in a particular market,
the number of newbuilding activities, the scrapping of older vessels and the number of
vessels getting out of active service.
There were numerous reasons affecting the rate of newbuilding, scrapping and lay - up.
These included:
24
" Newbuilding prices
- Secondhand vessels values in relation to scrap prices
- Costs of bunkers and other operating costs
e Costs of normal maintenance and insurance coverage
e The efficiency and age profile of the existing fleet in the market
e Government and industry regulations of maritime transportation practices,
particularly imposition of strict environmental protection laws and regulations.
The dry - bulk order book remained at 2002 at its lowest level for over two years,
standing at 8.9% of the existing fleet, compared to 17% twelve months ago. Vessels built
pre - 1981 (21 years +) represented 19.2% of the existing fleet (the average age of dry
bulk carriers was 23 years) and compared favourably with an order book of just 8.9%.
Contracting of panamax sized dry bulk ships had been abating in recent months in
response to the flood of new deliveries entering the market. Distant delivery dates for
newly ordered units had further compounded the recent downturn in interest in these
sizes.
Ordering of cape sizes has been limited reflecting the preoccupation of shipyards with
winning more contracts for the more lucrative large tankers and LNG carriers.
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A merchant shipping pool is a collection of similar vessel types under various ownerships
placed under the care of a common administrator. This administrator markets the vessels
as a single, cohesive fleet and collects ('pools') their earnings which in due course, are
distributed to individual owners under a pre - arranged 'weighting' system, by which
each entered vessel should receive its fair share. Pooling concentrates control of supply
side and has become much more prevalent over recent years. This will cause freight rates
to rise more sharply once demand comes back.
Due to the average age profile of the existing fleet, scrapping was likely to remain high.
Newbuilding order book had been shrinking to 9% from 21% a year ago. Deliveries of
new vessels had been high in 2001 (126 ships) but fell dramatically in 2002 (50 ships).
As a result supply side worries were decreasing, as fleet growth of 10% in 2001 was
followed by a stagnation in 2002.
The age profile of the fleet and new class regulations created the potential for exit from
the market of vessels built in 1975 - 1979.
(ISM) International Safety Management system
As a result of the 1994 IMO (International Maritime Organisation) decision over the
extension of the Safety of Life Sea (SOLAS) convention, owners and operators of all
vessels, including dry bulk carriers were required to develop, implement and maintain a
Safety Management System. The implementation of the ISM code was a costly necessity.
26
Non - compliance significantly restricted the ability to trade, as all Coastal States are
signatory members of the SOLAS Convention.
- Port state control
Each vessel, which enters the territorial waters of any coastal state, must be able to prove
to local Port State Control Authorities that it meets the International requirements and the
local by laws. Port State inspections have been increasingly stringent and any failure to
comply with the rules or convention requirements, results in substantial fines and trading
restrictions on non-compliant owners and managers. Vessels found failing these stringent
inspections will have to undergo immediate corrective actions, which in many cases
require vessels to undergo imminent repairs and upgrading. If their commercial
exploitation becomes non - viable, these vessels are obliged to be withdrawn from
trading either temporarily (lay up) or permanently (scrap).
e New (IACS) requirements
As a condition of classification with International Association Classification Societies
(IACS) since July 1998 all dry bulk vessels of 15 years and older are required to
strengthen the forward bulkhead. The same body has since then (July 2001) imposed
further requirements and processes to be undertaken on existing ships. These new
requirements have resulted in increased upgrading, repair and maintenance costs further
27
restricting owners ability to continue to operate older vessels, which immediately become
economically non - viable.
2.2.4 Market overview - outlook
A correlation of the current supply / demand imbalance, combined with improved trade
growth and the new regulations introduced in 2001, was anticipated as the main driving
force behind freight rates and values substantially higher commencing in the year 2002,
resulting in a repeat of the historical shipping cycle (see figure 3)
FIGURE 3: Dry Bulk Supply VS Demand and Dry Bulk Fleet Utilisation Rate
5
I
logs
-Dwt Demand 
-Fleet sizeI
98
14
$
~21
38 4
K
Ni 8~1
I
rj
84,11 i W W1 4.1 W91 01 t02104 t
28
3= I - __, 0 7 __ - - j.'VO _ _ -_ - , - k L E , "
t"I loot 2041 2062 1003 7004
2.3 Company 1 Shipping Company
Company 1 focused on major cargoes, having increased the share of coal and iron ore in
its cargo max to 55% in 2001 from 13% in 1994. Company's main trade routes are
described in table 1.
TABLE 1: Company 1 main trade routes categorized by commodities
For grains For Steel, grain For coal, iron ore
From To From To From To
US Gulf Continent Brazil China Australia China
US Gulf Mediterranean S. Africa Continent
S. America Continent Australia Continent
S. America Mediterranean S. Africa Far East
The young, modem company 1 with a fleet of 25 vessels provided significant advantages
for controlling operating costs. The positioning statement of the company mentions,
"Delivering timely, responsive and flexible service is a way of life in Company 1.
Additionally, the company believes that its success lies not only in efficient and effective
ship operations, but also in the company's dedication to provide solutions to customer
needs. The company has an outstanding track record in securing Contracts of
Affreightment and T/C fixtures that outperform the market (evidence is given in the
business plan).
During previous shipping cycles, Company 1 has established an outstanding investment
track record (figures are based on vessels purchased and sold):
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* Average IRR of 129% on acquisitions made during the late 1970's recession.
0 Average IRR of 41% on acquisitions made during the 1981 - 1987 recession.
- Average IRR of 77% on acquisitions made since 1999.
- 85% of ventures made at the bottom of the market produced outstanding returns.
- A limited number of ventures during market peaks produced negative IRR (9 out
of 39)
IRR calculations are based on annual cash earnings paid out to shareholders during the
holding periods and remaining shareholders equity upon liquidation of the company less
equity contributions made by shareholders at the beginning and during the life of the
project.
2.4 Considerations for Partnerships with Company 1
The company's well - deserved reputation was reflected, in its strong financial position
resulting from low operating costs and conservative financing arrangements. Company 1
enjoyed a high degree of operational consistency, good safety record, revenue and market
share growth. Company 1 had consistently achieved attractive earnings, both in volatile
and stable market conditions and had been continuously performing at an acceptable
earnings level during a very volatile environment. The underlying asset value
significantly exceeded the figures stated in the balance sheet as 75% of vessels were
acquired near the bottom of the market. (see tables 2, 3, 4).
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TABLE 2: Company's 1 Consolidated Balance Sheet
COMPANY 1 FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS - CONSOLIDATED B/S (MILLION t
2002 (PROJECTED) 2001 2000 1999
ASSETS
Current Assets
Cash $36.54 $25.53 $34.28 $52.73
Shareholders $0.00 $0.00 $7.50 $0.00
Other $11.96 $13.78 $8.61 $7.12
Total Current Assets $48.50 $39.31 $50.38 $59.85
Fixed Assets
Net Book Value $250.14 $267.02 $185.38 $155.26
Vessels under construction 110.76 10.00 $17.80 !t7.59
Total Fixed Assets $260.90 $267.02 $203.18 $162.85
Other Lonq Term Assets $14.04 $18.22 $18.85 $16.75
TOTAL ASSETS $323.44 $324.55 $272.41 $239.45
LIABILITIES & SHAREHOLDERS EQUITY
Total Current Liabilities $29.85 $30.59 $31.54 $34.93
Long Term Debt $145.04 $158.83 $107.03 $94.47
Shareholders Equity $148.55 $135.13 $133.84 $110.05
TOTAL LIABILITIES & SHAREHOLDERS EQUITY $323.44 $324.55 $272.41 $239.45
TABLE 3: Company's 1 Consolidated Income Statement
Company 1 Financial Highlights - Consolidated Income Statement (Million $)
2002 (Projected) 2001 2000 1999
Revenue $95.69 $81.42 $83.33 $55.53
Gross Profit $43.56 $28.07 $28.69 $14.64
Depreciation -$16.87 -$13.71 -$13.35 -$14.91
Administrative expenses -$2.60 -$2.56 -$3.40 -$3.35
Other income & interest earned $1.56 $1.73 $2.40 $1.26
Financial & Other Expenses -$10.23 -$9.57 -$11.86 -$7.79
Net Income / loss $15.42 $3.96 $2.48 -$10.15
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TABLE 4: Company's 1 Consolidated Cash Flow Analysis
Company I continued to report good results despite the general economic downturn.
Management expected margin improvements to continue:
- Gross profit margin increased from 26% in 1999 to 34% in 2000 and 35% in
2001. EBITDA and EBIT margins moved on a similar path.
- Positive effects of the fleet renewal / expansion program with some economies of
scale were already beginning to be related in the financial results and had
contributed heavily to the profit improvement.
- Some positive results from the new growth were also being felt, such as, for the
first time in its history of the group reached gross revenues in excess of $80
million in 2000. Lower net interest and financing expenses had also positively
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Company 1 Financial Highlights - Consolidated Cash Flow Analysis (Million $)
2002 (Projected) 2001 2000
Cash Flow from operations 36.56 21.94 19.91
(before changes in working capital)
Changes in working capital 1.08 -8.09 -3.07
Cash Flow from Operations 37.64 13.85 16.84
Cash Flow from Investment Activities -10.84 -81.19 -59.86
Cash Flow from Financing Activities -15.79 58.59 24.57
Change in Cash & Cash Equivalets 11.01 -8.75 -18.45
Cash & Cash equivalents at 25.53 34.28 52.73
beginning of period
Cash & Cash equivalents at em 36.54 25.53 34.28
affected Group's performance with net profit margins increasing continuously
since 1999, despite higher depreciation and amortisation charges.
Company 1 had a satisfactory liquidity and unchanged key figures. In detail, total
liquidity was sufficient for the company's current business activities. The company's
increased commitments had been well supported by higher levels of operating cash flow
and cash flow from financing activities. The company operated at a healthy equity / asset
ratio of about 42% that remained at reasonable levels despite the company's increased
investment activities over the last five years.
2.5 Investment opportunity
Company 1 management believed that a window of opportunity had opened since asset
prices in the dry bulk shipping market had now reached levels last seen in 1998/1999.
The company was now raising $100 million of equity capital to further expand its
presence into the market for cape - sized and panamax - sized dry bulk vessels and
continue to create value for the investors. Existing shareholders intended to contribute
about 1/4 of equity to this financing.
Company 1 would invest in the acquisition of newbuildings or modem second hand
vessels in order to take advantage of asset price cyclicality in the dry bulk - scrapping
sector.
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FIGURE 4: Panamax (10 years) - Historical and Expected Price Movements and
Capesize (10 years) - Historical and Expected Price Movements
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The time window during which successful investments can be made shall remain open at
least for the next 2 quarters. The anticipated recovery from the current dry bulk recession
should allow for an exit in 2- 3 years.
This market is highly cyclical, experiencing fluctuations in freight rates, profitability and,
as a result of these, asset values. Freight rate fluctuations can be minimised by entering
into long - term charter agreements, such as the ones available to Company 1. As an
example we can consider the case of a new cape - sized vessel with delivery in January
2004 where the company had been approached by first class charterers for long - term
charter greater than 5 years and at daily rates in excess of $15,000 (i.e. well above the
current market rate)
34
As asset values were at a 16 year low and had dropped by 17 % - 25% since 2000,
Company 1 intended to invest in panamax, capesize and, possibly handymax dry bulk
vessels, with a focus on modem tonnage (see figure 5)
FIGURE 5: 5 Year Old Second Hand Vessel Values - in Million Dollars
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45
40
35
30 CAPESIZE
-0PANAMAX
15 - HANDYMAX
1 0
56 02 7 02 88 0299 02 90 02 91 09 92 04 93 06 94 02 95 02 96 09 97 09 99 02 99 02 00 02 00 06 01 02 02 02
The principal objectives were to achieve both operating profits from the chartering of
ocean - going cargo vessels; and capital gains both from buying low and selling high.
The anticipated recovery from the current dry bulk recession should allow for an exit in 2
- 3 years. Based on conservative cash flow and asset appreciation assumptions, Company
1 expected an annualised equity return in excess of 30% (this comes from a projected
base case of investment in a new cape - sized vessel ordered in 2002 and assuming a 2
year holding period, where it was calculated to have
a projected IRR of 37%, based on actual offer prices
for newbuilding contracts today, realistic freight rate
and operating cost assumptions as well as historical
vessels prices at market peak (see table 5)
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TABLE 5: Company's 1 Illustrative Return Analysis
2.6 Liquidation Options and Exit Strategies
There were various alternatives to liquidate so as to maximise value depending on market
conditions. These are shown in table below:
36
X ESCALA ION 3% 3%
.MARW5% 5% 5
I USES OF CASH
SSL R~E Nu~*1 cs i Sty4hC);0 SOU R
VESSEL pRICE (0wtnMm cap vh d ry 41h 0 2=3) 336 LOAN FACIJTY 70% 52520
EQUrIY CONTRUTION $10.80
TOISl $36 TOW $3
&DENA DAYS 60 360 360
liNS COSTSIDAY 53800 $3914 S4,031
C RATE IDAY $16000 318100 M2000
TOTAL REVENUE S960 000 3 480 000 $7 200 000
TA OPEL 3228000 $1428.610 31471468
SURVEY PROVISON AOC 0 50 50
WESSEL's RESIDUAL VALI 30 50 $W000 000
EUITDA $73204 35051 .16 $57532
LOAN FACLTY _I
OPEING 1aLANCE $25 200000 25 200 000 323 940 000
PITEREST $210000 1 260 000 $1 197000
ertCaLm REPAYMENT 12c V LOm PmOP $D I1 2WII $23-940000
1000BALANiCE $25 20D OOD $231940-000 $0
NT CASHe FLOWI Sl0w i S25313901 if3p591ik3
/BALACEI
Pmm BALANCE $10 800 000 SM2 000 S3W M5 9
DRAWY UDOM~ 4$10000 00 so $0
TCASH FLOW $527- OW 2S531-390 323.532
LWWNG CAAN M AL AACE $S2Z.OW $",5J3tV S2&6d",922
METn CAS FLW 10.8m0.000 $522.000 $2.53f.390 $23.591.532
Awns-- Ing wrwl Itu ar Actual price levels reached during 91/92 peak even for
1/ $3 attheeftl4 te P od;vessels with lower qualify specifications.
TABLE 6: Company's 1 Liquidity Options
In conclusion, the business plan argued that the timing was optimal for taking advantage
of the best cyclical opportunity in over a decade. Additionally, the decline in freight
markets had rock bottomed and demand was expected to increase, beginning in the
second half of 2002. Furthermore, company believed that the anticipated annualised
return will be in excess of 30% through a combination of operating cash flows and asset
appreciation. The brand name of Company 1 was a known high quality, low cost dry bulk
vessel operator with strong relationships with major charterers. Finally, the company had
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Individual Vessel Fleet sale Refinancing of the Public Market Exit
Sales Fleet
In a rising market a In a consolidating Additional equity Company will have
vessel's sale can be market, the value of created through rise achieved critical
completed within a the investment could in market value of mass to achieve a
period of 2 - 3 weeks be maximised the vessels can be successful IPO
through a sale of the paid out as dividend depending on the
entire fleet to shareholders status of the equity
through refinancing markets and their
of the fleet in the appetite for shipping
banking and/or
public bond markets
Typically 10 - 15 Traditionally least
buyers inspect desirable, as public
vessels markets value
shipping companies
at a discount to Net
Asset Value
the ability to take advantage of the company's 25 years of experience and proven
investment track record.
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2.7 The Deal: What did actually happen?
The company finally obtained $83 million, which finally seemed to be not enough since
the investment had great success.
Company 1 fully took advantage of chartering their vessels in good terms, and sold a
number of vessels during these 3 years. Company 1, as mentioned above had aimed at an
IRR of about 37%. Based on 31/12/05 and taking into account distributions made so far,
the estimated residual value of the company is $125,000,000; the actual IRR of this
investment is close to 200%.
How can these huge amounts of profits be explained? Profit is simply, revenues minus
costs (profits = revenues - costs). Additionally revenue is equal to price times quantity.
The amount of revenues made is determined by the amount of competitors (which will
influence price) and the amount of consumer demands (which will impact the amount of
quantity).
In this situation, competition can be neglected, since the amount of vessels demanded is
more than the vessels supplied (thus shipowners will operate with price inelasticity,
which will allow them to increase prices without losing the market). As far as the other
determinant of revenues is concerned, consumers have huge demands, in other words
countries will have big imports. Additionally, countries have increased their production,
which will lead to an increase in exports. Given that quantity of products transported is
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huge and is growing and price is increased compared to previous years, revenues will
increase.
On the other hand, total costs are equal to total fixed costs plus total variable costs. Costs
could be assumed to remain constant. So by increasing revenues and keeping costs
constant profits will finally increase.
Baltic Exchange Dry Index (BDI) is an index illustrating the dry bulk overall market
situation. As figure 6 shows, from 2002 (the time when the business plan was written),
the dry bulk market made an "explosion". People involved in the market mention that the
market has reached levels that will not appear again in the shipping industry.
FIGURE 6: Baltic Exchange Dry Index
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Researchers and the market players have given many explanations of this explosion. First
and foremost, the main influence is the huge growth of China. Additional reason of the
good performance of this business plan is the limited amount of vessel supply. Moreover,
the port congestion (and limited infrastructure) played a major role in limiting supply of
vessels and as a result the vessels available in the market were limited by a substantial
amount.
Good forecasting of the consulting companies combined with the great experience and
good aspiration of managers gave the opportunity to Company 1 to fully succeed in this
investment.
Overall, in the macro side it was demand (China), which was the major influence for
success, while in the micro side it was prices. Finally, in the business side it was the
superior management.
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CASE STUDY 2
(When things are worse than expected)
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Company 2 is one of the major producers of ice canes in Athens, Greece, as well as it
has space for refrigerated warehousing. It operates in a very strategic location, as it
is only few kilometres from the main fish suppliers in Athens. The plant is operating
for about 70 years, and plans to improve its operations as well as its cost structure
by innovative ideas. Company 2 is aiming to raise money through a government
subsidy. The business idea is based on the development of the appropriate technical
standards of the production and distribution of ice, the development of strengths
vital to logistics/distribution business. Finally, it aims to renovate and modernise its
infrastructure to adjust to modern technical standards.
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3.1 Brief history of the company and its aspirations
Company 2 was formed in 1993. In the same year the company acquired through an
auction a multi-temperature warehouse and ice factory group with an incorporated
autonomous refrigeration unit. This complex is located in Piraeus, Greece, in proximity
to the port and the railway station. The company's fixed assets consist of 4,074.77 m2
land with a four floor building of 26,000 m3 total capacity of refrigerated warehouse.
The unit was constructed in 1939 in order to meet the special needs of the surrounding
area.
The motivating business concept for Company 2 was its aim to attract subsidization from
the Greek Ministry Of Industry, Energy and Technology. The core business of the
company incorporated the following activities:
1. Production and distribution of ice.
2. Frozen food warehousing and transit on behalf of other companies (Multi-temperature
food warehouse, for frozen, chilled and ambient short life foods.)
3. Provision of refrigeration facilities and services to manufacturers, occupied with the
collection, standardisation and packaging of fishlike products.
In this case by the term warehouse we imply refrigerated warehousing.
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4. Materials and products logistics/distribution for the manufacturing, retail and shipping
industry.
The proposed investment aimed to:
1. The development of the appropriate technical standards, necessary to support the
administration and organisation of the company, in order to become more flexible in
the production and distribution of ice, while at the same time to improve its links with
suppliers and customers and overall market presence.
2. The development of competitive strengths vital to the logistics/distribution business,
by the implementation of technical know-how and technology.
3. Renovation of the company's buildings, in order to adjust them to new technical
standards, necessary for the attainment of high quality market standards.
4. Modernisation of building - renovation of engineering equipment.
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3.2 The market overview
The refrigerated warehouse industry in Greece remains a capital-intensive and very
competitive sector. Especially in Attica where land is expensive compared to the suburbs.
Company 2 meets the challenge of satisfying the increasing customer demand for better
quality services, within a "cost down" environment.
In the long term, increased productivity is the only way for Company 2 to maintain its
competitive advantage. Furthermore, close links with the multi-temperature warehouse
market and the various distribution centers are vital for a sound marketing policy.
The risk of new market entrants in the market was eliminated, due to governmental
legislation that prohibits the issuing of new warehouse licenses to potential entrants. Ten
market participants existed in the warehouse market of Athens, while at the end of the
investment program Company 2 was expected to have a market share of 7%. This market
appeared to have a propitious future, given that all market participants worked at full
capacity unable to meet the increasing demand arising from the retail sector.
Finally, Company 2 was the only ice trader in the wider area of Athens and ice is the
only irreplaceable mode for preserving fresh fishlike products.
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3.2.1 Target Segments
The market was segmented into different groups in order to satisfy customer needs and
raise its profitability by product differentiation. The market was divided into major
segments, and the company evaluated and targeted the market that it could serve best.
Company had the following 2 targets:
1. Market for ice products including free flow packaged ice-canes2
2. Market for multi-temperature warehouses providing refrigeration facilities to third
parties and Logistics/Distribution of materials and products supporting shipping,
manufacturing and retailing industry. Company 2 took advantage of its strategic
location, which was Piraeus, which was close to the main end customer (few km
apart).
The company had a dynamic marketing strategy with several segmentation sub-strategies.
Brand names, packaging and promotion were used to create a brand image, which led to
individual psychological and emotional preferences. The company measured and
forecasted the attractiveness of the market, estimated market size, growth profitability
and risk and potentials.
2 Known as Ice "column" and weights 22 kg each.
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3.2.2 Demand
Demand in the market for ice products, as well as in the multi-temperature warehouses,
displayed the characteristics of a growing market. Demand was growing fast especially as
many customers from the retail sector entered the market. Both market segments grew as
customers became familiar with the company's product/service. As a result of market
growth, Company 2 continuously tried to improve its cost structure in order to increase
its profit margins (the company was trying to operate with economies of scale as well as
find innovative ways to decrease costs)
In this environment market power out passed technological knowledge as a competitive
edge rather than as barrier to entry, given the protection the company enjoyed from the
existing legislation. In the market of multi-temperature warehouses few companies had
yet achieved significant economies of scale or differentiated their product sufficiently in
order to achieve brand loyalty. Company 2 expected the rivalry to be low as the current
rapid growth in demand for both ice products and multi-temperature warehouses enabled
the existing participants to expand their revenues and profits without taking market share
away from competitors. Operating within this environment Company 2 had the
opportunity to expand its operations in order to seize the opportunity at this stage and
prepare itself for the intense competition of the coming market shake out.
The main customers were small fishing companies as well as large-scale retailers and
manufacturers that required the highest quality standards.
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3.2.3 Demand and Trends
Virtually the lack of competition and substitute products in the market for ice products
resulted in price inelastic demand for the product, allowing the company to increase its
prices when necessary without decreasing the demand.
Ice is a product characterised by high seasonality with demand increasing during the
summer period and falling during the winter. From statistical data obtained from the
National Statistics Agency, the company aimed to sell 750,000-850,000 ice columns per
year but unfortunately the current capacity did not allow the company to produce more
than 600,000 columns without unnecessary high energy consumption and waste of water.
Diseconomies of scale in the production of ice did not allow Company 2 to produce
cheap enough ice when they exceeded that production limit. The inability to satisfy the
excess demand for ice during the summer period was getting even worse. The investment
layout was designed to meet this supply shortage problem in the most economically
efficient way by expanding capacity, improving the cost structure, and satisfying the
seasonal demand.
The multi-temperature warehouse was another propitious market. Although there was
excess demand for more space, all market participants operated at full capacity. Excess
demand, in combination with strict regulatory environment, justified the company's
increase in flexibility in production as well with high quality standards. Not to
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underestimate the fact that the company could think of creating more storage space so as
to absorb the excess demand. These facts would have an immediate reaction in turnover.
From a marketing perspective, Company 2 wanted to associate itself with quality. It was
therefore trying to improve its products and services by creating reputation, which would
influence customers buying behaviour. Herzberg's theory says that there are satisfiers
and dissatisfiers, satisfiers are the motivators and therefore sellers should avoid
dissatisfiers such as poor training or poor service policy.
3.2.4 Competition and Market Summary
The competitors of the company came from the
market of multi-temperature warehouses. They
were highly specialised and experienced family
owned companies with limited capital resources.
It can be seen in Tables 7,8,9 that the total market grew by 2% in 1995 while for the same
period Company 2 market share decreased by 45.7% to 2.41% in 1995 from 4.52% in
1994. The leading competitor (Company A) increased its market share to 12% from 11%
in 1994.
The market share of the competitor (Company B) remained in fact at 4.6% while the
market share of close laggards increased slightly during 1995. Although the market
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analysis data showed a reduction in the company's market share, when for the same
period total market grew, this trend can be well explained by the fact that Company 2
operations were seriously disrupted by essential capital improvements that took place in
its building during 1995.
TABLE 7: Multi - Temperature Warehouse Market
YEA MARKET CAPACITY STAFF SHARE FIXED
R PARTICIPA M3 NO CAPITAL & ASSETS
NT RESERVES million
million Drachmas
Drachmas
1994 Company F 30,000 30 240 830
1995 1 35 253 841
1994 Company G 40,000 50 230 801
1995 50 297 818
1994 Company H 40,000 25 216 396
1995 1 25 209 403
1994 Company B 70,000 49 125 1,641
1995 65 284 1,608
1994 Company D 17,000 14 37 474
1995 14 50 483
1994 Company E 15,000 26 66 383
1995 28 126 391
1994 Company A 20,000 62 105 295
1995 62 240 308
1994 Company I 50,000 14 500 327
1995 14 550 417
1994 Company C 27,000 38 35 307
1995 38 65 317
The secondary data shown on this
STATISTICS AGENCY (Greece)
table have been provided by the NATIONAL
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TABLE 8: Market Analysis
MARKET Company 2 TOTAL
SALES GRD3
1994(13/4/93-31/12/94) 226,850,130 5,000,000,000
1995 123,019,540 5,100,000,000
% CHANGE -45.70% 2%
TABLE 9: Market Analysis by Major Competitors 4
SALES MARKET SHARE PROFIT
3 The exchange rate between the Greek drachma
drachmas for $1, in 1995 237.04, in 1996 247.57,
1999 328.44, in 2000 365.62.
and the
in 1997
dollar in 1994 was 241.49
282.98, in 1998 281.23, in
4 Market Share is not 100% when added because four Companies (major players) did not
provide their information - the rest market share (approximately 60%) is covered by
small companies.
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TOTAL MARKET
1994 5,000,000,000 369,000,000
1995 5,100,000,000 386,000,000
Company 2
1994 226,850,130 4.5% (68,916,865)
1995 123,019,540 2.4% (98,105,422)
LEADING COMPETITOR
(Company A)
1994
1995 579,000,000 11.5% 110,069,000
610,000,000 12% 106,580,100
CLOSE COMPETITOR
(Company B)
1994
1995 230,000,000 4.6% 67,000,000
235,000,000 4.6% 69,000,000
LAGGARD 1
(Company C)
1994 115,100,000 2.3% 22,000,000
1995 120,150,000 2.35% 18,150,000
LAGGARD 2
(Company D)
1994
1995 105,500,000 2.1% 3,000,000
115,000,000 2.3% 15,000,000
LAGGARD 3 (Company E)
1994
1995 90,000,000 1.8% (49,000,000)
95,000,000 1.9% (21,000,000)
3.2.5 Pricing Policy
Company 2 was operating in an oligopolistic market where prices were set by law.
However, threat of entry into this market was limited because of the regulatory regime
and as a result the company did not expect an impact on its pricing policy arising from
the introduction of new competitors.
An advantage of Company 2 was the fact that its main shareholder company was ready to
provide liquidity and finance the company in case it faced cash flow difficulties, which
would probably make some competitors of the company leave the market.
ice
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3.3 Company 2 -Ice canes producer and Warehousing
The unit was acquired in 1993 at a cost of GRD 451,000,000 and the necessary capital
came exclusively from share capital issues, in the form of currency (US DOLLARS)
while the necessary capital for the materialisation of the investment plan would also
come from foreign direct investments. The main shareholder in Company 2 was
Company W a company registered in Luxembourg, which had contributed since April
1993 till 2000 GRD 1,250,000,000 for share capital subscriptions. Company W had
expressed in writing its intention to support financially the investment layout and the
company's long term operating activities.
In addition the company signed a loan agreement for GRD 205 million with Bank E in 17
October 1995 and this amount would be used exclusively to improve the company's fixed
assets during the first phase of the investment layout, which was expected to be
completed in 1997. Additionally, the company borrowed GRD 500,000,000 for the
completion of the investment.
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FIGURE 7: Company's 2 Initial Investment in 1994
The investment finance is shown below:
FIGURE 8: Company's 2 Business Plan 1996-1997
BUSINESS PLAN FINANCE 1996-1997
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Ice Production
The company produced ice canes in small ice containers, which were packed into two
bigger ice containers filled with frozen salt. The largest ice container consisted of 55
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INITIAL INVESTMENT IN 1994
Land
34 Buildings
42%
Mechanical
equipment
24%
rows of 36 containers, while the smallest container consisted of 32 rows of 34 containers.
The daily production capacity of the first container was 1980 ice columns and the second
1088 ice columns ensuring a total daily capacity of 3068 ice columns. The ice was cut off
the container using a crane and three workmen.
In addition, Company 2 produced packaged ice-cubes by using filtered water subjected to
ultra violet light, which was analysed regularly by independent laboratory services.
Regular visits from the Environmental and Health Departments ensured the highest
hygiene standards were maintained. Using the highest possible manufacturing and
packaging standards made the product attractive and different. The company's production
capability ensured that ice would be available throughout the year and especially during
the summer period where the demand for ice was greater.
Warehousing
The warehouse can accommodate the need for storing and transporting different food
products at different temperatures. According to the European standards, frozen foods
need to be kept at approximately -18 degrees centigrade (c); cold chilled fresh meat and
fish is handled at 0 degrees c; fresh produce and provisions should be retained between
+5 and +10 degrees and ice cream in -25 degrees. Grocery products such as biscuits,
breakfast cereals, cakes and crisps should be kept at ambient temperature.
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Each section can be managed individually, to take account of the different handling and
operating procedures that are necessary. In addition a composite distribution trailer
contains flexible bulkhead partitions and can be utilised as one, two or three sections at
different temperatures. The coolest compartment would be at -25 degrees c.
Some products are received into warehouses for servicing stock purchases for a limited
period: other deliveries are sorted for immediate onward movement. Each customer of
the company's warehouse has its own cage in each section of the warehouse and the
goods are placed in these cage, awaiting loading and transfer. Quality and quantity are
both checked thoroughly at the goods inwards points of the warehouse, and unpacking to
allow fast and easy shelving in the stores themselves, is often another service carried out
with our warehouse.
Short-life food products are normally distributed to the retailers in full container loads
between midnight and 8:00 am. Long shelf-life products are delivered separately
between 8:00 am and 8:00 p.m. to spread out the demands for unloading and shelving.
Company's 2 major supplies were water and electricity provided by two nationalised
companies, The National Water Utilities Company and The National Electric Company.
Company's 2 premises as previously mentioned (before investment) consisted of a four
floors building of total capacity 26000 m3 and 4074.77 m2 of company's owned land;
their market value (Tax authorities valuation) was GRD 730,000,000.
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The table below shows some of the major resources of the company.
TABLE 10: Critical Success Factors (CSF's) - Key Tasks Underpinning Success
CSF'S INBOUND OPERATION OUTBOUND MARKETING CUSTOMER
LOGISTICS S LOGISTICS /SALES SERVICE
Speedy product/servic Cost data Transmit quick
quotation e retrieval quote to quotation to
estimation. purchase price customer. customers
tracking.
High attention Crew Accurate Product
to customer dispatching to information on service
service. customer site. customer base. information
Effective van for customer.
utilisation Customer
/computer feedback.
aided picking
and loading
Perceived Supplier Invoicing
financial appraisal and customers
competence tracking
Competitive Speed of Sales force
'advantage throughput report (we
(how quickly have to know
we put a new what our
idea into the competitors
market) do).
Optimal Appropriate Adequate size Store location Identify
warehouse distance from of store for simulation and market trends
location and customers product range optimisation. using EPOS.
size using DSS.
Competitive Reduce Capture sales Effective load Evaluate
prices transport data quickly and crew profitability of
costs(schedule and efficiently dispatching lines using
d delivery and using EPOS.) and use of DSS.
the use of DSS Close
EDI) partnership
with
customers
facilitated by
EDI.
EDI = Electronic data interchange is the direct computer-to-computer exchange between
two organisations of standard business transaction documents such as invoices, bills of
lading, and purchase orders
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DSS = Decision support systems are interactive computer based systems to facilitate the
solution to unstructured problems by a set of decision makers working together as a
group.
EPOS = Electronic point of sales
3.4 Considerations for Partnership with Company 2
Company 2 had a very strong reputation in Athens, Greece. Even though the company
did not make any profits in the year 1994-5 it seemed that it had a very promising future
and this was evident in the profit and loss account where losses had been limited in 1995,
displaying an upward trend. Company 2 was operating in an oligopolistic market and it
had the advantage of the legislation that imposed barriers to entry. Additionally the
company was trying to find ways so as to decrease operating costs (ie switching from
ammonia to R22, which would decrease energy consumption), which meant that the
company would become more efficient. Turnover seemed to fall in 1998 due to
renovation, so it could not operate in full capacity.
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TABLE 11: Company's 2 Profit and Loss Account
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT
(AMOUNTS IN DRACHMAS) GRD
REPORTED FIGURES BASED ON PROJECI7ONS
Operatng results 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Net turnover 291,486.884.00 123,019.540.00 211,983.570.00 482.565,150.00 581,280.450.00 620,638.500.00 658,490.100.00
Less:Cost of sales 350.617.167.00 185,363.880.00 190,600,000.00 200.130,000.00 210,136.500.00 220,643.325.00 231,675.491.00
Gross operatng results -prfiV(oss) 59.130,283.00 - 62,344,340.00 21,383.570.00 282.435,150.00 371,143.950.00 399,995.175.00 426,814.609.00
Less:Administrative expenses 30.923,826.00 - - - - -
Operating results -profit(loss) - 90.054,109.00 62,344.340.00 21.383.570.00 282.435,150.00 371,143.950.00 399,995.175.00 426,814.609.00
Plus:lnterest receivable 3,201.325.00 210,252.00 - -
Less:Vaious expenses 11,084.600.00 5,045,981.00 8,479.343.00 19,302.606.00 23,251.218.00 24.825.540.00 26,339,604.00
Profit(Loss) before interest. depreciation.tax - 97.937,384.00 - 67.180069.00 12,904.227.00 263.132,544.00 347,892.732.00 375,169.635.00 400,475.005.00
Less: interest payable 168.038.00 1,736,796.00 32,691.658.00 43,852.007.00 17,703.155.00
Profit(Loss) before depreciation. tax 98.105,422.00 68,916.865.00 - 19.787.431.00 219.280.537.00 330,189.577.00 375.169.635.00 400.475.005.00
Less:Depreciation - 75,448.080.00 75.448.080.00 75,448,080.00
Proft for the year before tax 98.105,422.00 - 68,916.865.00 - 19.787.431.00 219.280.537.00 254,741.497.00 299,721.556.00 325.026.925.00
Less:Income tax - - 11.364,787.00 89.159.524.00 104,902.544.00 113.759,424.00
Profit for appropriation 98.105,422.00 - 68,916.865.00 19,787.431.00 207.915,750.00 165,581.973.00 194,819.012.00 211.267501.00
TABLE 12: Company's 2 Balance Sheet
Company 2
BALANCE SHEET
(AMOUNT IN DRACHMAS) GRD REPORTED FIGURES FIGURES BASED ON PROJECTIONS
ASSETS (1314/93-31/12194)199 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2005
B. FORMATION EXPENSES
1.PRELIMINARY EXPENSES 436,360.00 436,360.00 436,360.00 436,360.00 436,360.00 436,360.00 436,360.00
TOTAL FORMATION EXPENSES 436,390.00 436.360.00 436360.00 436,360.00 436,360.00 436,360.00 436,360.00
C.FIXED ASSETS
11Tangible assets 452,934.506.00 748,961,590.00 1,168,961,590.00 1,508,961,590.00 1,508,961.590.00 1,508,961,590.00 1,508,961,590.00
Accumulated deprecialion - - - - 75,448,0800 150,896,159.00 226,344,239.00
NET TANGIBLE ASSETS 452,934,506.00 748,961,590.00 1,168,961,590.00 1,508,91,590.00 1,433,513,511.00 1,358,065,431.00 1,282,617,352.00
III Financial assets 1,700,000.00 1;700,000.00 1,700.000.00 1.700,000.00 1,700.000.00 1,700,000.00 1.700.000.00
TOTAL FIXED ASSETS(CII + CII) 454,634.506.00 750,661.590.00 1,170,661,590.00 1.510,661.590.00 1,435,213.511.00 1,359,765,431.00 1,284,317.352.00
D.CURRENT ASSETS
II Debtors 11.315,487.00 12,101,066.00 17,665,298.00 40.213,763.00 48,440,038.00 51,719,875.00 54,874.175.00
III Notes receivable - - - 63.732.812.00 331,179.242.00 615,182.125.00
IV Cash at bank and in hand 11,586.935.00 1,121.015.00 1,766,530.00 4,021,376.00 4.844,004.00 5,171,988.00 5,487.418.00
E PREPAYMENTS AND ACCRUED INCOME 1,046,340.00 2.891,623.00 2,891,623.00 2,891,623.00 2,891,623.00 2.891,623.00 2,891,623.00
TOTAL ASSETS ( B+C+D+E) 479.019,628.00 767.211.654.00 1,193,421,400.00 1,558.224,712.00 1,555,558.347.00 1.751,164,519.00 1,963,189,052.00
LIABILITIES
A CAPITAL AND RESERVES
I Share capital 500.010,000.00 500,010,000.00 682.410,000.00 804.010,000.00 804,010.000.00 804.010,000.00 804,010,000.00
U Shareholders contributions 56,319,374.00 249,234,732.00 249,234,732.00 249.234,732.00 249,234,732.00 249,234,732.00 249.234,732.00
IVReserves - - - 1,055.302.00 10,336,937.00 28.895,441.00 57.089,395.00
V Retained profltl(loss) - 98,105,422.00 -167,022,287.00 - 186,809,718.00 20,050,731.00 176,351,069.00 352,611,576.00 535,685,124.00
SUBSIDIES - 152.000,000.00 304,000.000.00 304,000,000.00 304,000,000.00 304,000.000.00
TOTAL CAPITAL AND RESERVES 458,223,952.00 582.222,445.00 896,835,014.00 1,378,350,764.00 1,543,932,738.00 1,738,751,749.00 1,950,019,250.00
C CREDITORS
ILong-term debt - - 91,200,000.00 152,000.000.00 - -
Ila Short-term debt - 96.151,935.00 201.146,715.00 182,226,444.00 - -
Ilb Current liabilities 14.020,811.00 88,837,274.00 4,239,671.00 9,651,303.00 11,625,609.00 12,412,770.00 13,169,802.00
TOTAL CREDITORS 14,020.811.00 88,837.274.00 95.439,671.00 161,651,303.00 11,625,609.00 12.412,770.00 13,169,802.00
D ACCRUALS AND DEFERRED INCOME 6,774,865.00 - - -
GRAND TOTAL LIABILITIES (A+C+D) 479,019,628.00 767,211,654.00 1,193.421,400.00 1,558.224,712.00 1,555,558,347.00 1.751,164,519.00 1,963,189.052.00
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3.5 Investment Opportunity
Company 2 was the only ice trader in the area of Athens while ice was the only and
irreplaceable mean for preserving fish-like products. Additionally, Company 2 supplied
the retail and catering sector with ice cubes that were of the very highest quality. The
high demand for this new product arose from the high quality of production that ensured
a totally bacteria free product. The free flow ice cubes ensured that the customer would
always be satisfied with the convenience of the product and would not be faced with bags
containing solid blocks of ice. The unit had been producing ice since 1939 and enjoyed
the benefits of a large international parent company.
Stability guaranteed that the customer would never be let down and emphasis was placed
in consumer satisfaction. Company 2 was the most dependable company in the business.
Company guaranteed delivery service to all locations within the wider area of Athens
providing emergency services whenever required.
In addition, developments in the Greek retail industry and particularly the introduction of
foreign Super-markets added more value to the company's regional multi-temperature
warehouses as large retailers looked to have sufficient products on the selves to cover a
maximum day's sales without needing substantial on-site warehousing as it was both
cheaper and easier to restock shelves outside peak shopping hours. There was a great
need for retailers and manufacturers to work closer with warehouses, in order to achieve
organic growth, increase productivity and achieve competitive prices.
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The company was a well-positioned specialist distributor, ready to seize the opportunity
for close co-operation with manufactures and retailers. Effective distribution could
reduce costs whilst improving the overall level of service. In the Greek market, more than
40% of the products were distributed via intermediate warehouses. Distribution to the
company's warehouse was known as primary distribution and was normally provided by
manufacturers, while the movement on to the retail stores was designated as secondary
distribution. Multi-temperature composite warehouses required very specialised skills
and the company believed that it specialised in food warehousing.
The company's customers were using their specialised skills, which allowed them to
focus on their core skills and competencies. Moreover they achieved cost savings and it
was likely that this would improve efficiency and productivity, while the capital
investment in the facilities and the trucks was provided by the company. Need for the
company's services exists and their purpose was clear - to provide a cost effective, high
service level, distribution system. Success required close co-operation, understanding
and trust.
Turning into numbers, Company 2 estimated that the IRR will be 9.69% which was an
acceptable percent. The projected IRR was presented bellow, which showed that the
company increased its current assets, which was due to non-distributed profits and
considerably low liabilities. In addition, the estimated sale on 31/12/2000 seemed to
result in a residual value of 2,362,000,000 drachmas.
62
TABLE 13: Company's 2 Projected Internal Rate of Return
YEAR 'TOTAL EQUITY
INVESTED
in GRD Currency
EQUITY INVESTEE RESIDUAL VALUE
PERANNUM
in GRD Currency in GRD Currency
556,329,374
749,244,732
931,644,732
1,053,244,732
1,053,244,732
1,053,244,732
1,053,244,732
- 556,329,374
- 192,915,358
- 343,061,807
- 320,656,461
- 86,818,288
- 70,033,139 2,360,000,000
- 556,329,374
- 192,915,358
- 343,061,807
- 320,656,461
- 86,818,288
2,289,966,861
IRR
. i 1
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1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Estimated sale proceeds on 31/12/2000 1,700,000,000
Plus Current assets 675,000,000
Less liabilities 13,000,000
Residual value 2,362,000,000
3.6 Liquidity options
With the current situation the company was not allowed to liquidate any of its assets,
since the government would subsidise the infrastructure (so make profits and gain money
from taxes) as well as to employ many people so as to decrease unemployment. This
would exist for the next 10 years. Nevertheless, after 5 years of operation the company
could ask formal permission from the government to change the industry in which the
company was operating. However, in case the regulation preventing new comers to enter
the market was reformed, liquidation and exit options would be significant especially due
to the rise in the value of the real estate.
There were various alternatives to liquidate so as to maximise value, depending on
market conditions. These were either to sell the whole complex with all its running
contracts. Or, Company 2 could pay the compensation of quitting the contracts with the
suppliers, demolish the building (or keep the building) and sell it. Finally, the company
could demolish the whole building and create another factory, which could be more
profitable.
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3.7 The Deal: What did actually happen?
Company 2 finally got the subsidy from the government; however, due to unforeseen
events the company did not operate as planned. Even though projected IRR was 9.69%,
which seemed very promising, the actual IRR turned out 3.86% (see bellow).
TABLE 14: Company's 2 Actual Internal Rate of Return
'TOTAL EQUITY
INVESTED
in GRD Currency
556,329,374
749,244,732
960,146,539
1,082,563,000
1,082,563,000
1,197,035,500
1,249,535,500
EQUITY INVESTED
PERANNUM
in GRD Currency
556,329,374
192,915,358
343,061,807
320,656,461
86,818,288
70,033,139
RESIDUAL VALUE
in GRD Currency
1,850,000,000
556,329,374
192,915,358
343,061,807
320,656,461
86,818,288
1,779,966,861
IRR 3.86%
YEAR
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Estimated sale proceeds on 31/12/2000 2,600,000,000
Plus Current assets 114,590,000
Less liabilities 845,000,000
Residual value 1,869,590,000
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As shown from the above table, compared to the projected IRR the actual price of the
building went much better than expected. However, current assets were much less than
expected, since profitability was much less and liabilities grew in a faster than anticipated
pace.
There were many reasons that contributed to the malfunction of this investment. These
can be categorised into four main areas: market, technical, legal, economical and
financial issues.
Market
The law, which restricted the gratification of new licenses to industrial installations in the
area of Attica, which gave the opportunity to Company 2 to be profitable, finally was
reformed. This allowed new entrants to build and operate industries within Attica. As a
result Company 2 had to face fierce competition.
Additionally, it was estimated that there was a reduction of volume of fishes and fishing
activity. As a result the demand for ice cubes was less than what was estimated.
Technical
Even though the company had invested heavily in R&D on the alteration of ammonia to
R22 in order to decrease energy costs, this ended with the opposite consequence. This
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was because, R22 is not as efficient as ammonia, which means that R22 needed more
power consumption compared to ammonia, which meant that cost of power increased
dramatically.
Company 2 faced great costs for replacement of the old machines as well as the costs for
the maintenance of stability of the building (the building was old enough and had a small
inclination). In order to make the building safer, there was finally a loss of volume (about
30%), which was estimated to be a revenue loss of 80,000,000 drachma. Moreover, costs
of maintenance were very high, something that the company totally miscalculated. The
company had estimated a number, which was almost close to nothing.
Legal
When the company tried to refurbish the stability of the building, the management team
wanted to take off its employees, which meant to temporarily quit all the contracts that
the company had since this would increase safety and decrease costs and take them back
when the work has ended. However, the Greek courts did not accept this demand, which
made the company not to fully operate since most of the employees had to help for the
refurbishment. As a result the company was not able to reach customers' demands. This
led to decrease of market share, which was directly reflected to the profitability of the
company.
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Economical and Financial
Projections of investment were not estimated correctly since hidden costs were coming
through. Running costs went up, such as municipal costs as well as increased employees
costs.
The final point of failure of this investment was the fact that, the company borrowed in
Japanese Yuen (JPY) instead of Greek drachma, considering the interest of JPY was
0.50% against 17% of the drachma. After few months, Greece depreciated drachma by
15% because it wanted to enter the Eurozone. Additionally JPY made gains to IMM
(International Monetary Market). As a result the company did not take advantage of this
"trick".
3.8 Recommendations to VC's:
Due to unforeseen rise in real estate, VC's should sell the building and exit business, by
terminating all contracts that the company had. This would generate excess profits plays.
Second step would be to demolish the whole building and operate in another industry
(more niche). Finally, they could aim at targeting in warehousing it gives the highest
returns to the company.
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CASE STUDY 3
(Things were worse than expected)
Table of Contents:
4.1 Brief history of the company and its aspirations.
4.2 The market overview
4.2.1 Market size and scope
4.2.2 Greek transportation
4.2.3 Competition
4.2.4 Barriers to entry
4.2.5 Major threats
4.2.6 Target market
4.3 Company Group 3
4.3.1 Corporate structure
4.3.2 Capitalisation
4.3.3 Management
4.3.4 Strategic alliances
4.3.5 The aircraft
4.3.6 Operations
4.4 Considerations for Partnerships with Company 3
4.5 Investment Opportunity
4.6 Liquidity Options
4.7 What did actually happen?
We review an excellent idea well suited for a particular environment with no
prevailing competition for the time being or the near future. We examine the critical
impact of the absence of a legislatory framework on innovative business ideas and
the importance of policy and law on business development.
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4.1 Brief history of the company and its aspirations
Very rarely does a business opportunity present itself where demand for a service is
insatiable and the supply non - existent, where market and legal dynamics converge to
create the opportunity to be first in; where consumer awareness occurs virtually
overnight, and where the introduction of this product or service will change the way
people live, work and play forever.
Some of the world's largest companies today had such a beginning. In these cases
however, new technology needed to be invented, expertise had to be created and markets
had to be educated.
Imagine now such an opportunity, but where the technology exists, the expertise is your
partner, and your customer is already educated. Nothing to be invented, the world's best
people in place, customers that have only dreamed about what you have to offer and
virtually no competition while you commence operations. This is a very rare occurrence;
this is a very rare opportunity. This is Company 3.
Company 3 is a Canadian company, owned by a founding group of business and aviation
experts from Canada and Greece. It has two Greek subsidiaries - together these
companies are a licensed air carrier under the Joint Aviation Authority (JAA) and the
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Joint Aviation Rules (JAR) and under the jurisdiction of the Greek Civil Aviation
Authority (HCAA).
Through these subsidiaries the company was introducing the globally proven service
commodity of seaplane air travel to the country of Greece; a country in which not a single
seaplane existed.
The upcoming Olympics offered a very significant revenue opportunity to the company.
The need to move officials, athletes and, indeed, tourists faster, safer and more efficiently
would be a top priority for both the government and the various organising committees.
Aerial sightseeing was non - existent in Greece and the Olympics represented an
opportunity for the company to capitalise on the demand for sightseeing that the
Olympics would create.
These realities translated into tremendous support from both Government and business
leaders alike. Company 3 permit and license process had been expedited from the
unanimous desire of all authorities to have seaplanes in Greece as soon as possible and
ideally before the opening ceremonies of the Olympics in August 2004.
The requisite infrastructure was in place. Company 3, through the acquisition of
Company U, owned a valid and existing Air Operations Certificate. The company
received a Commercial License executed by all required authorities that together with the
AOC confirmed the complete ability to operate an airline in Greece. Aircraft had been
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leased, experienced pilots and maintenance personnel had been hired, Athens base
facilities had been identified and agreements drafted, fuel supply had been arranged.
Marketing advertising, media management, pre - launch agendas had been prepared.
Strategic alliances had been made and letters of intent with travel, courier and hotel
companies were being entered into.
The management of Company 3 brought years of business and airline operating
experience and expertise including successfully operating the largest seaplane business in
the world. The people entrusted to implement this plan brought a clear and precise
knowledge of what it took to operate a successful aviation business. Together with the
expert staff and crew Company 3 would "forever change how the people of Greece live
and work".
The mission statement of the company is:
With an unwavering commitment to customer satisfaction and passenger safety,
Company's 3 mission is to become the leading provider of efficient, affordable and
reliable harbour to harbour seaplane service within Greece and, ultimately, the
remainder of Europe.
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The company had the following short-term objectives:
1) Complete delivery of the second De Havilland DH - 6 Twin Otter to Athens, on
or before June 15, 2004.
2) To implement pre - launch operations including industry, customer and media
awareness campaigns, test charters, infrastructure and systems de - bugging.
3) To commence commercial sightseeing operations by July 1, 2004.
4) To maximise revenue generation by capitalising on the Olympic Games-related
increase in tourism and domestic travel and sightseeing.
5) To commence scheduled service operations by October 1, 2004.
6) To add six aircraft per year during
years one through five for a total of
25 at the end of year five.
7) To secure sufficient capital in a
timely fashion to enable these
objectives.
Company 3 had generated a tidal wave of interest from island governments, tourism
based businesses, courier companies, the health and safety divisions of the government
and other parties all of whom recognised the economic and social significance of what
the company offered and were afraid that they will miss our on this service if they did not
act quickly. Many inducements had been offered to the company in this process that
represented extremely rare and lucrative benefits that would typically not be made
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available under conventional business circumstances. This was the magnitude of
Company 3 impact in Greece.
4.2 Market overview
4.2.1 Market size and scope
Greece had 10,000,000 residents and receives approximately 11,000,000 visitors annually
that occupied 90,000,000 room nights in the hotels of Greece. The majority of visitors, as
well as Greek residents traveled to the various islands and coastal ports in Greece.
Tourism and related sectors contributed 15% to the GDP of Greece's economy making it
the largest single contributor to the economy. There are over 1,500 islands in Greece of
which 70 represented major traffic islands that tourists and Greek vacationers frequented.
Of these 70 islands only 27 had dry land airports leaving over 40 islands that were not
accessed by airline services of any kind.
4.2.2 Greek transportation
Greece had a very small commercial and general aviation sectors relative to its
population base, tourist traffic, geography and its proximity to Central Europe. One
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reason for this was that until 1991 there was a monopoly power from a company
(Company A). Since deregulation, other companies had entered the market. (see table
below)
TABLE 15: Company's 3 Major 'Air' Competition
Airline Fleet Size Aircraft Type Destinations
Company A 35 A340s, A36s, All Greek Airports
B734s,ATR42/72s,
DHC8
Company B 14 B734s & RJ100s 13 major Greek
destinations
Company C 3 A320s International Flights
only
Company D 1 B733 Wet lease
Company E 8 4 Helicopters & 4 Ad - hoc and
Gen. Av. Aircraft Charters
Company F 3 2 Jetstreams and 1 Ad - hoc and
Piper Chieftain medivac
Company G 3 Piper Chieftains Ad - hoc and
Charters
Company H 1 Beachcraft Ad - hoc and
Charters
Note: Only Company A and B provided scheduled services to Greece's islands airports.
In addition to the small domestic fleets servicing the Greek islands there were a fleet of
charter aircraft that flew international tourist to these destinations. These aircraft did not
fly domestically within Greece nor do they fly multi - stop routs to the islands. These air
carriers by virtue of the customers they brought to Greece were feeder airlines for
Company 3 and Company 3 anticipated entering into code share and package
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arrangements with these carriers to enhance the products they could sell to their
passengers by moving their passengers inter - island.
No scheduled passenger (or cargo) helicopter service existed. Greece had very few
helicopters relative to its population. The current active fleet was operated primarily as
private owner transportation or corporate charter. This was because it was very
expensive.
Greece had 14 major ferry operators who combined to operate a fleet of over 200 ferries.
Trips ranged from 1 hour to 14 hours. These gave the chance to passengers to ship their
car to the islands.
4.2.3 Competition
At this time no direct competition existed. Company 3 would be the first licensed
operator permitted to offer any kind of float plane passenger service in the entire country.
Thus competition would exist only from existing transportation methods. Company 3
believed that its competitive advantages would help the company to manage this
competition. (competitive advantages will be presented in investment opportunities).
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4.2.4 Barriers to Entry
With licensing and regulatory obstacles managed; the primary barrier become availability
of aircraft and personnel. Some of the most difficult barriers that the company would face
were:
1) Permits and licensing of scheduled float operators,
2) Large scale availability of aircraft,
3) Availability of landing points,
4) Availability of personnel, pilots, mechanics and support industry,
5) Availability of strategic operating partners like Harbour Air,
6) Travel industry loyalty.
Due to the inclusion of Greece in the EU many of additional barriers had been solved
such as corruption, ownership restrictions, language, currency etc.
4.2.5 Major threats
Operations could be affected by the following events:
1) Unforeseen changes to aviation rules and regulations,
2) Natural disasters,
3) Accidents involving company's aircraft,
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4) Failure to secure adequate capital,
5) De - mobilisation of aircraft through mechanical failure,
6) Seizure of aircraft by authorities due to legal or civil issues.
4.2.6 Target Market
Company 3 would be attracting passenger traffic in the following categories:
1) Non - vehicle ferry passengers,
2) Commercial airline passengers,
3) Tourists without vehicle,
4) Residents without vehicle,
5) Sightseers,
6) Charter groups and users,
7) Government contracts.
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4.3 Company Group 3
4.3.1 Corporate Structure
FIGURE 9: Corporate Structure Chart
Subsidiary Comp
100% Mother Compan
any 1
any90% GG
(Main shareholder)
Company 3 4 -
10%X
51%
Subsidiary Company 2
49%
The mother company was incorporated in British Columbia, Canada on March 2004.
The group was then ready to move from set up development to operations; the Company
would complete a transaction with Subsidiary 1 to facilitate the Canadian company
becoming the new parent. This would happen on April 2004.
Subsidiary 1 was incorporated under the laws of UK in May 2003 as a limited liability
company. Subsidiary 1 was considered as the temporary parent company of Company 3
for set up and development purposes. It would remain dormant until the mother company
wished to offer sea plane services to the UK marketplace or other European
marketplaces.
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Company 3 was incorporated under the laws of Greece in September 2003. It would be a
subsidiary of the mother company and would be the commercial operating company for
the Greek operations. Ownership rules stipulated that the Greek operating company must
have a minimum of 51% EU based ownership and a maximum of 49% non-EU base.
Subsidiary 1 would own 90% of Company 3 while, for regulatory reasons, 10% will be
owned by the key management, in trust. The ownership structure could be amended in
order to assure civil aviation ownership requirements were met.
Company 3 completed the purchase of Subsidiary 2 of Greece. The purpose of this
acquisition was specifically to acquire the valid and existing AOC currently owned by
Subsidiary 2. Whereas Company 3 was the commercial operating company, Subsidiary 2
was the technical certified permit holder.
4.3.2 Capitalisation
The mother company had authorised capital of 100,000,000 shares consisting of
80,000,000 common and 20,000,000 preferred shares. To date 15,000,000 common
shares had been distributed to founders, key management personnel and seed round
investors in the raising of high risk seed funding.
Management stock options would be made available to key management personnel after
operations commence and would be based on achieving the revenues and profits
81
projected in this plan. Employee option programs would also be integrated to attract and
reward the best calibre of employee.
4.3.3 Management
Overall the company's management team was highly organised and experienced in the
market, able to tackle any unforeseen circumstances. The company had also the ability of
business advisors.
4.3.4 Strategic Alliances
Company 3 had created some very important alliances. Firstly, Company 3 had contacted
the World's largest service provider (Company Z). Company Z and Company 3 had
entered into a lease agreement for it first aircraft and service agreements whereby
Company Z provided, crews, parts and services to Company 3.
Additionally, Company 3 had come to an alliance with a group, which owned five of the
best newspapers in Greece, as well as periodicals (publicity with no cost). Additionally
they own one of the largest travel network in Greece; however, Company 3 had to give
exclusive right to the group to market excess seat capacity on a commission basis.
Company 3 has received considerable support from this group.
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Finally Company 3 and one of the World's premiere hotel brands, would announce a
letter of intent between the two companies to develop special travel packages and VIP
service for the hotels guests.
4.3.5 The aircraft
Company 3 had selected to operate De Havilland Otter and Twin Otter (DHC - 3 & DHC
- 6) aircraft. The initial fleet of aircraft would consist of 3 twin otters to be in service by
July 2004. The larger twin otter had been selected as the introductory aircraft primarily to
address a demonstrated perception on Greece that the larger two engine aircraft were
safer than the smaller single engine aircraft. Company 3 had leased two DHC - 6 on a
five year lease basis with and option to purchase. Company 3 intended to add 6 aircraft
per year culminating in a fleet of 25 aircraft after five years consisting of both DHC - 3
and DHC - 6 aircraft (there were some differences between these two aircrafts but not
huge). Lease costs ranged from 15% - 24% of the capital value of the asset making
leasing a more expensive option than financing.
Aircraft would be obtained on the open market and could be acquired under a number of
financial scenarios (prices varied from 500,000 to 1,400,000 euros in very good
conditions).
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The finance could be 100% from loan to value and interest rates as low as LIBOR plus
1% but typically average LIBOR plus 2.5%. The aircraft would be acquired by the
financing company and will remain titled to them until final payments are made. As the
company operated the aircraft in Greece, lenders might require additional security during
the early term of the lease. This security might take the form of cash bonds, third party
guarantees or replacement assets.
Company 3 had entered into a brokerage agreement with a well known company to assist
the company in the acquisition and financing of the aircraft.
4.3.6 Operations
Company 3 would begin its pre - commercial operations activities on May 2004. The
objectives and focus of the pre - launch were to:
1) Introduce the concept and service to the travel industry, media and peoples of
Greece,
2) To test and de - bug the installed facilities and systems.
The routes that the company would serve would be divided into regions for the purpose
of creating local seaplane transportation efficiencies. These divisions or hubs would be
set to connect various islands and coastal towns that belonged to a group based on
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proximity and administrative and commercial needs of the local population. These groups
in turn will be interconnected to provide more choices for travelers and holiday makers
(actually the company would serve the whole Greece).
The arrival departure points and the inherent services provided there would vary in type,
scope and configuration. They included:
1) Full scale facilities built, owned and operated by Company 3,
2) Private marinas,
3) Simple common public docking facilities,
4) Public and private floats
5) Arrival departure docks.
Terminal facilities would be established in various destinations and could range in cost
from 0 to 500,000 euros each to build. Facilities could take the form of leased store from
premises to full-scale stand-alone proprietary structures. They will facilitate parking,
check in, security, provision of food and beverage, reading material, shopping,
communications, toilet facilities etc. There would also be transportation provided to and
from these facilities. Company 3 would also provide all these services at a VIP level.
These terminals would be operated as a profit centres.
Jet fuel was favourably priced, was widely available on all islands and was the preferred
fuel for the chosen aircraft. In case large quantities of fuel were not able to reach the
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place the where the plane was (for safety and environmental reasons) craft fuel would be
trucked. Total daily fuel cost was estimated to 3,900 euros approximately.
Aircraft parking services, baggage loading and unloading, and baggage and freight
handling services would be performed by Company's 3 personnel and facilities.
Maintenance would be provided by Subsidiary 2.
The company would be promoted by many means as mentioned. Not to underestimate the
fact that it would also be promoted through the internet.
Finally, the company would provide, at a premium cost, VIP services to a select list of
VIP clients directly and through affiliated hotels and tour providers. Some of the service
would include limousine transportation, VIP check in, VIP lounge facilities etc.
4.4 Considerations for Partnerships with Company 3
TABLE 16: Cash Activity Statement to May 2004 (Use of Proceeds)
Cash from shareholders E 1,400,000
Operating costs paid 1,020,000
Purchase of Subsidiary 2 E 180,000
Cash on Hand E200,000
Accrued Liabilities -E400,000
Net Position -E200,000
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TABLE 17: Individual Aircraft Revenue and Direct Expense Analysis
Per Hour Per Year Per Hour Per Year
Scheduled Service
Maximum Passenger Load w/o Luggage 14 14 15 15
Scheduled Service Hours 1 1,800 1 1,800
Saleable Seat Hours 14 25,228 15 27,095
Price Per Seat Hour C 125 125 125 125
Maximum Gross Ticket Sales C 1,752 3,153,497 C 1,882 3,386,842
Load Factor 75% 75% 75% 75%
Gross Adjusted Ticket Sales C 1,314 2,365,123 C 1,411 2,540,132
Sightseeing Service
Baular
Maximum Passenger Load w/o Luggage 14 14 15
Scheduled Service Hours 1 1,800 1 1,800
Saleable Seat Hours 14 25,228 15 27,095
Price Per Seat Hour (Regular) C 150 150 150 150
Maximum Gross Ticket Sales C 2,102 3,784,197 C 2,258 4,064,211
Load Factor 75% 75% 90% 90%
Gross Adjusted Ticket Sales (Regular) C 1,577 2,838,148 C 2,032 3,657,789
Olmi
Maximum Passenger Load w/o Luggage 15 15
Scheduled Service Hours 1 2,880
Saleable Seat Hours 15 43,352
Price Per Seat Hour C250 250
Maximum Gross Ticket Sales C 3,763 10,837,895
Load Factor 90% 90%
Gross Adjusted Ticket Sales (Olympics) C 3,387 9,754,105
Freight
Maximum Saleable Load 325 325 300 300
Scheduled Service Hours 1 1,800 1 1,800
Saleable Freight Load 325 585,000 300 540,000
Price Per lb C 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Maximum Freight Revenue 325 585,000 C 300 540,000
Load Factor 50% 50% 60% 60%
Gross Adjusted Freight Revenue C 163 292,500 C 180 324,000
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TABLE 18: Set Up and Business Development Cost Analysis - May 2, 2003 to
December 21, 2003 - Un - audited, Funds in Euros
Cost Item
Adverising and Publication
Automotive & Transportation
Bank Charges
Communications
Education & Training
Furniture Fixtures & Equipmnent
Insurance
Meals & Entertainment
Miscellaneous
Office Rent and Rates
Office Utilties
Prntin, Postage, Courier
Professional Fees Accounting
Professional Fees Consultants
Professional Fees- Legal
Taxes, Fees, Levies
Travel & Accommodation
Unallocated Set -Up & Other
Wages, Salary, Benefits
Total Indirect Operating Costs
Operating Profit (Loss)
Subsidiary 2
3 4 5,0.00
Company 3
C
C
C 363.79
C 328.92
5 394.51
7,049.28
C 2 052 00
C 174.49
C 4,752 00
C 29,959.74
C 120 000.00 __
C 160388 22
-C 160, 388.22
C 751 20
S4, 716 25
C 9,533 02
C 5,000.00
C 4,826.55
C 2,600.00
C 30,000.00
C 141- 7 946
550. 47
-C 95,530.47
Consolidated
S0.00
4 3,450.00
C 363 79
C 328 92
C 5,394 51
C 7,049.28
C 0.00
C 0.00
C 2,052.00
C 00
C 000
C 751 20
C 4,890.74
C 24,25.02
C $,000.0O
C 4,826.55
C 2,600.00
C 59,959.74
C134,-46 q9S
C 25 89 69
- 255,898 6
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TABLE 19: 5-Year Revenue and Expense Projections
Year 1
Gross Potential Revenues
Scheduled Service
Sightseeing, Charter & For Hire
Freight & Cargo
Total Gross Potential Revenues
Adjustments
Commissions/Frequent Flyer
Bad Weather No Fly Allowance
Maintenance No Fly Allowance
Total Adjustments
Gross Operating Revenue
Cost of Sales
Direct Operating Expenses
Indirect Operating Expenses
Total Cost of Sales
Gross Operating Profit
Operating Expenses
General and Administrative
EDITDA
Gross Profit Margin
Operating Margin (EBITDA)
Break Even Load Factor
EBITDA per Share
C 3,048,158
5,974,389
486000
Year 2
C 19,369,671
6,613,583
3.059.250
Year 3
C 31,002,276
10,347,217
4877.250
Year 4
C 41,449,485
13,654,109
6.506.250
Year 5
C 47,914,155
15,593,510
7.505.625
C 9,508,547 C 29,042,504 C 46,226,743 C 61,609,844 C 71,013,290
C 1,426,282 C 4,356,376 C 6,934,011 C 9,241,477 C 10,651,993
285,256 871,275 1,386,802 1,848,295 2,130,399
190,171 580,850 924,535 1,232,197 1,420,266
C 1,901,709 C 5,808,501 C 9,245,349 C 12,321,969 f 14,202,658
C 7,606,838 C 23,234,004 C 36,981,394 C 49,287,875 C 56,810,632
C 3,544,633 C 11,746,100 C 17,935,700 C 23,355,200 C 26,380,667
698,250 1,756,750 2,169,922 2,433,740 2,815,268
C 4,242,883 C 13,502,850 C 20,105,622 C 25,788,940 C 29,195,935
C 3,363,955 C 9,731,154 C 16,875,772 C 23,498,935 C 27,614,697
1,476,600 2,166,300 2,872,200 3,346,500 3,525,000
C 1,887,355 C 7,564,854 C 14,003,572 C 20,152,435 C 24,089,697
35.38%
19.85%
64%
CO.10
33.59%
26.41%
50%
CO.39
36.69%
31.70%
44%
C0.73
38.42%
34.64%
41%
C1L05
39.29%
36.64%
39%
1 .26
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TABLE 20: 5-Year Cash Flow Projections
Cash Flow Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Bank Balance (Opening) 200,000 2,137,355 5,502,208 15,055,780 32,358,215
Proceeds From Investors 1,800,000
Income/Loss from Operations 1,877,355 7,564,854 14,003,572 20,152,435 24,089,697
Capital Expenditures
Tenrmial - Hub 500,000 1,500,000 2,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Terminal - Destination 250,000 1,500,000 1,250,000 750,000 750,000
Aircraft Lease Deposits 500,000 600,000 600,000 500,000 300,000
Parts Inventory/Spare Engines 500,000 - - -
Miscellaneous - 600,000 600,000 600,000 600,000
Total Capital Expenditures 1,750,000 4,200,000 4,450,000 2,850,000 2,650,000
Bank Balance Closing 2,137,355 5,502,208 15,055,780 32,358,215 54,045,412
C2.84C1.68CO.80(0.28CO.10
227,383
Bank Balance (Cash) per Share
Lowest Bank Balance 6/2004
4.5 Investment Opportunity
To the extent that Company 3 would compete with other modes of transportation and
perhaps future seaplane operators, it would enjoy the following advantages:
First in Strategy - Company 3 as "First in Operator" would initially have 100% market
share. It could secure prime landing and facilities locations in very desirable destinations
creating a barrier of entry for subsequent operators. First in aspect also created industry
leader "generic" brand recognition.
New Travel Experience - Company 3 believed the travel industry demanded and
embraced alternative and better travel methods to serve its clientele and that the
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uniqueness of the proposed concept as a travel method would create tremendous interest
from the travel industry and would differentiate Company 3 from other travel service
providers.
Entrenchment - Harbour to harbour air service would quickly become an integral
indispensable and critical part of everyday life and business dealings for many island and
coastal markets making it an essential service and changing the way this areas and their
residence, live, work and play.
Flexibility and Agility - the ability to create new routes that were currently unserviced
through existing means, to service small markets profitably and to take maximum
advantage of potential route subsidies from the Government where other modes could
not.
Few Able Competitors - Globally, there were only 19 scheduled sea plane service
operators and none existed within the EU or Eastern Europe. Scheduled service existed in
only 7 markets worldwide. This restricted pool of competitors diminished conventional
competition concerns and helped to maintain Company 3 market share.
Low Start-up & Operating Costs - Alternative transportation systems incurred
substantially higher set-up costs, operating costs and capital expenditures to commence
operations making additional competition from alternate means unlikely.
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Simplified Delivery Process - Check-in, boarding, disembarking were all streamlined
and as such the number of steps involved in delivery of service was considerably reduced
over those involved in the delivery of ferry and land based aircraft services.
Lower Staff Requirements - The number of staff required to deliver the service per
customer, and to reach profitability was less than those required by existing travel
operators.
Scheduled, Port to Port Services - Company 3 would introduce the proven commodity
of seaplane travel to the country, islands and people of Greece. The service approach was
"no frills" with emphasis on time savings, convenience and courteous handling of
domestic regional and tourist passengers. Surveys had shown that customers preferred
"low fares"; however, travelers were not willing to compromise on issues of safety or on
time performance. Company 3 covered these demands.
Convenience - A trip from Athens to Mykonos for example was 1 hour from start to
finish, compared to other means that varied from 4.5 hours to 8 hours (by air and sea).
These time savings were created both through the speed of travel, the directness of the
routes and the simplicity of the check in, boarding and disembarking processes.
Price Point - The price of the fare of a seaplane would be approximately 30% less than
the ordinary airplane fares, and competitive to fast ferry services.
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Better service - This came from complete servers training, which brought high
customers service quality, something that the Greek transportation industry lacked.
More Exciting Travel Experience - The enjoyment (and the fact that people would not
have previously seen and experienced it), effectiveness and efficiency of the process as a
travel method offered the most overall attractive features available to the passenger.
Sightseeing - No significant organised aerial sightseeing or "flightseeing" existed in
Greece (especially during the Olympic games).
Charter and for Hire - Group charter opportunities were numerous and included
personal groups, government, corporate, institutional, scientific, medivac, search and
rescue, sports teams, advertising and promotional, among others.
Freight and Courier - Current transportation systems had resulted in little effective
courier or small cargo transportation being available. This was primarily due to the slow
delivery time and high cost of current transportation means. There existed a considerable
opportunity for Company 3 to use its assets in the development of this sector. Company 3
would provide freight and cargo services on a scheduled route or for hire basis. Pricing
was dependent on the routing, weight, dimensions and content of goods being delivered.
Public Service Operations (PSO - Subsidised routes) - The Government of Greece
subsidised several ferry service routes to non-economic island ports to ensure residents of
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these islands had basic transportation services to and from the islands. These were
necessary due to the seasonality of many ferry schedules and in some cases simply were a
result of low resident populations creating insufficient commercial demand (the
government subsidised ticket prices and or guaranteed a minimum sales quota to ferry
operators).
The economics of sending ferries to many of these destinations, even infrequently, was
extremely poor. Vessel operating costs were very high. The government was seeking a
cost effective replacement method to service some of the existing PSO's as well as new
PSO destinations for which even ferry services were not possible.
Company 3 had been requested, through the Ministry of Transportation, to develop a
PSO package utilising seaplane aircraft. Under this package the government would
guarantee revenues and would be able to more flexibly address the demands of the PSO
routes.
Emergency Service - Company 3 would make its aircraft available on a charter basis to
various agencies for emergency services that include, medivac, air/sea rescue, search and
surveillance, fire - fighter and emergency personnel transportation, and policing.
Other Services and Revenue Streams - Food, beverage, and merchandising, equipment
and service leasing, training and education, advertising sales and cross promotion.
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Additionally, due to the large amount of vehicles in Greece, ancient road networks,
perpetual road repairs, limited rail systems and common public transportation strikes
contributed to the congestion problems nationwide. This gave rise to an environment in
which even short coastal port to port travel over existing roads was so time consuming
and expensive that sea plane travel would, for some, become a reasonable alternative to
the vehicle. This was not the case in other markets like Vancouver where roads systems
were more efficient and vehicular operating costs were lower.
Despite the proliferation of vehicles, a large percentage of the population and tourists
alike did not own or rent vehicles, and instead relied on taxis for transportation.
Therefore, these people had limited options for mainland or intra - islands coastal travel
of any distance. This would give a competitive advantage to Company 3.
Even though the company might be a monopoly, it decided not to set very high fares
(possibly could be a price close to 250 euros per seat hour). Company 3 targeted to a
price of 125 euros per seat hour, which would bring a comfortable gross margin,
EBITDA margin, and break-even levels without exploiting its monopoly power. Thus the
company would create goodwill, wide acceptance, and travel habit conditioning at all
customer levels while maintaining profitability.
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4.6 Liquidity Options
There were numerous alternatives in case the investment fails. Firstly, the company could
sell all its fleet to another company abroad or to another Greek investor. Alternatively,
Company 3 could change these planes into normal planes by setting to them a pair of
wheels. Thus the company could sell the planes to wealthy men who would want the
planes for personal use (or for their company's). Taking into consideration that the planes
were built around the late 1950s another option was to sell them after some years as
antiques.
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4.7 What did actually happen?
Even though the company wanted to start its operations before the Olympic games 2004
(summer 2004), it started its operation approximately 2 years later. As a result the actual
results of the company do not yet exist.
However, it is interesting to see what was the reason why there was such a great delay.
According to the newspapers as well as inside information from the company,
bureaucracy was the major obstacle both from the government as well as the local
communities (where the seaplane would serve), which were not optimistic and did not
want to take the risk of such a project. Apart from bureaucracy sometimes ministers had
forgotten about the investment and some other times they rejected businessman's
requests because of "law gaps".
The company did not plan for the bureaucracy and the lack of a concise legislatory
framework for assuming operations. Overlapping governmental agencies and the absence
of operations since 1929 required an immediate update of the existing legislation, which
however, took much more than initially anticipated. Furthermore, due to the use of sea
space there were several conflicts with the army and the agency for antiquities as well as
several objections by environmentalists, which raised significant concerns.
Finally, significant difficulties appear in recruiting local people for performing operation
in a foreign country and building up team spirit, which is absolutely necessary for a
business that requires the integration of operations, marketing and people
97
Chapter 5
5.1 Where does Profitability come from?
Profit equals revenues minus costs. However, revenues and costs are evaluated bearing in
mind a huge amount of parameters.
FIGURE 10: Where does Profitability come from?
Etc...
Price
Etc...
Profits
evenues
Etc...
Volume 
Etc...
Etcc...
Fixed < Etc...
Costs KEtc...
Variabletc...
< Etc ...
Revenue is equal to price times volume (quantity). Revenues depend on the company's
business strategy, they way it handles competition and its adaptability to customer needs.
A company can create additional demand and fully exploit this demand by either
introducing a new product or throwing in a new type of service. Most of the time,
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between the introduction of new products or business concepts; the main efforts of the
company lay in market share maximization. When things turn to customers, the company
has to bear in mind 'what segments exist?', 'how do customers make purchasing
decisions?', 'what specific features do they look for?.
Cost is the sum of craft capital costs plus operating costs. By craft capital cost it is meant
the acquisition cost, spares cost etc, whereas, under operating costs it is the sum of fixed
costs which can be depreciation, interest, insurance etc, plus the variable costs which can
be fuel, oil, engine overhaul, maintenance, crew etc. In order for a company to reduce
costs they need to be able to answer the following questions and try to have them in mind
at every time of operation. The company should know 'what are the major cost factors',
'how do they vary with volume', and 'what are they likely to be over time'. The whole
cost analysis is illustrated in the figure bellow.
OR?
99
FIGURE 11: Cost Analysis
Total Costs
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5.2 What are the steps for a new company to succeed?
When creating a new company three things that have to be thoroughly investigated:
software, hardware and people. Software is the economics of your business (pricing,
marketing, revenue management, etc.). Simply speaking it is all the stuff for which you
need an economic algorithm for maximizing market share. In other words, it is the
brainpower that helps the company survive competition? In addition, is the company able
to cover the required amount of costs so as not to result into becoming bankrupt? Finally,
are the consumers sufficient for the product or the service you provide? Will they be
willing to take your product or service?
Hardware is the infrastructure (material and non-material) of the business. Does the
company have a sufficient network, which adapts optimally to the needs of your
business? Furthermore, does the company have high-quality infrastructure so as to gain
any competitive advantage?
People (management) apply software on the hardware and produce, results and ideas.
Does the company have a good corporate structure? Do these people have entrepreneurial
feeling? Do they have high skills (leadership etc)?
When a new company includes all the above mentioned it is supposed to be able to enter
the market.
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5.3 Where does performance come from?
However, the next big thing is the factors, which determine performance when a
company enters the market. This depends highly on how well the management team has
evaluated the market and how well they know how to operate a new company. Have they
understood the trend of the market correctly? This is highly dependable in addition to
marketing research, on luck (probably of good timing).
In addition the management should be able to have a complete scene of the 'hardware'.
Are they able to operate correctly the company? Have they organized well the supply
chain and logistics of the company? Is the company technologically advanced? All the
above-mentioned questions determine whether the performance of a company will be
flourishing or not. (See table bellow)
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FIGURE 12: Where does Performance come from?
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5.4 Where did profit/loss come from for the three companies?
What went well bad with their performance?
5.4.1 Company 1
5.4.1.i Profitability/Loss
As mentioned also in Chapter 2, profitability for the company came from the increased
volume demanded. Taking into account that the amount of vessels demanded were much
more than the vessels supplied, the price that the manager would demand was big
(following the trend of the market). So it can be mentioned that the company operated
with price inelasticity. This means that the company had huge revenues.
Taking into account that the company started investing when the market was low, the
acquisitions costs were low (and the company sold some of its vessel when the market
was high). Taking into consideration that operating costs for a ship do not change
overtime, the profits for the company were huge.
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5.4.1.ii Performance
The performance of the company was great due to the fact that the company had a very
good corporate structure with people who knew very well the industry. The company was
able to forecast efficiently the trend of the market (they understood the strong position of
China) as well as they evaluated correctly the fleet that will not be able to accommodate
demand. Finally it could be mentioned that the company was very lucky and had a perfect
timing for its investment.
5.4.2 Company 2
5.4.2.i Profitability/Loss
Due to the deregulation that took place in the market, new companies entered the
company. This means that the company's volume sharply decreased. Additionally due to
the increased competition existing in the market the price that the company had to set was
relatively low compared to what the company used to charge its customers. This means
that Company's 2 revenues gradually reduced over time.
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As far the cost side is concerned, firstly the company acquired the factory/warehouse in a
very good price. However, the factory/warehouse, was in a bad situation which meant
that the replacement costs were very high. Fixed costs can be considered as being
constant, but, the variable costs increased dramatically. This mainly took place for two
reasons. At first, the transition from ammonia to R22 increased energy consumption,
which results into increased cost. Additionally, the company had to spend a great amount
of money for research and development. So overall the costs increased considerably.
Consequently it is easy to understand that the company faced losses.
5.4.2.ii Performance
It is fair to say that the company was unlucky. Things would be completely different in
case deregulation did not take place and the company retained its monopoly power. From
the time the government started giving licenses to new companies the company started
struggling. Another unexpected event was the fact that the fish volume that fishermen
caught was relatively less than what it used to be (so demand for ice reduced). In addition
to that the company lost the court of quitting the operation of the factory/warehouse due
to renovation (for safety reasons it had to stop operating), which made the company not
to operate efficiently.
Furthermore, the people involved in this project, as previously mentioned did not
calculate costs correctly. Additionally, the management team was not able to understand
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some hidden costs that arose during the operation of the company. Moreover, the
company did not forecast the exchange rate that resulted in a loss for the company.
I would say that the company had organized well its supply chain - logistics, scheduling.
5.4.3 Company 3
5.4.3.i Profit/Loss
For that category there is nothing that can be mentioned since the company has just
started operation (however, it was supposed to start 2 years before). The only thing that
should be mentioned is the fact that they missed the Olympic Games which would be a
great boost for the company, since it would be a great promotion for the company.
5.4.3.ii Performance
It could be mentioned that the company shows introduces a niche product - service in
Greece. Additionally the infrastructure is at a very good stage and continuously expands.
If they are lucky they can succeed and create huge profits.
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5.5 Important Factors for a Successful Introduction
Company
TABLE 21: Major Factors for Success for Company 1
COMPANY 1
(1) Able to Raise (6) Flexibility
Money (diversification)
(2) Healthy Accounts (7) Reputable
(3) Attractive (8) Good Employees
Earnings
(4) Experience (9) Low Cost
Company - Operating
Cost
(5) Good Safety
Record
PLANNING
(1) Good Business (9) Highly
Plan Organised
(2) Diversification (10) 'First in
(of fleet) Strategy'
(3) Demand/Supply (11) High Quality
(4) Competition (12) Good
Consultancy
(5) Acquisition Cost (13) Low Staff
Requirements
(6) Exit at a Good (14) Operate
Timing Efficiently
(7) Liquid (15) Know their
Hardware
(8) Good Corporate
Structure
of a
UNEXPECTED
EVENTS
(1) Perfect Timing
(2) Lucky
ANALYSIS
(1) Good Market
Research/Prediction
(2) Forecasting
(3) Try to hedge risk
(4) Operational
Consistent
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TABLE 22: Major Factors for Success for Company 2
(1) Able to Raise (5) Economies of
Money (from Scale (same
subsidy) employees - in both
warehousing and
_________________ production)
(2) Big Company (6) 'Dual' Operation
"Behind"
(3) Experience (7) Reputable
(4) Flexibility (8) Good Employees
ANALYSIS
(1) Poor Market
Research/Prediction
(2) Miscalculation
(3) False Forecasting
PLANNING
Before Deregulation After Deregulation
(1) Able to Raise (7) Economies of (1) High Competition
Money Scale (common
management,
employees)
(2) Acquisition Cost (8) High Quality (2) Low Demand
(3) Competition Low (9) Good (3) High Supply
Consultancy
(4) Strategic Location (10) Address (4) Price Wars
Customer Needs
(5) Big Company (11) Multiple
"Behind" Operation of Firm
(6) Demand/Supply (12) Liquid
(13) Good Business
Plan
UNEXPECTED EVENTS
Before Deregulation After Deregulation
(1) Lucky (1) From oligopoly to perfect
competition
(2) Perfect Timing (2) Unlucky
(3) Subsidy
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COMPANY 2
TABLE 23: Major Factors for Success for Company 3
THE
COMPANY
(1) Big Company
"Behind"
(2) Experience
(3) Able to Raise
Money
(4) Flexibility
(5) Reputable
PL ANNING
(1) Perfect Timing (12) Acquisition Cost
(2) Good Business Plan (13) Achieve Economies of Scale
(3) Monopoly - Competitive (14) Diversification
Advantage
(4) First in Strategy - New (15) Overcome 'fear' of New
Experience
(5) Highly Organised (16) Good Service
(6) Demand/Supply (Olympic (17) Good Consultancy
Games 2004)
(7) Good Publicity (18) High Quality
(8) Good Price (19) Customer Satisfaction
(9) Multiple Operation of Firm (20) Liquid
(10) Convenient (21) Identification of key
Framework for launching the
project
(11) Good Corporate Structure
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ANALYSIS
(1) Good Market
Research/Prediction
(2) Operational
Consistent
(3) Unexpected
Events (Try to
hedge them)
UNEXPECTED
EVENTS
(1) Bureaucracy
(2) Unlucky
TABLE 24: Relative Ranking for Success/Failure for Company 1,2,3
Relative Ranking for Relative Ranking for Relative Ranking for
Success for Company Failure for Company 2 the Delayed
1 Introduction of
Company 3 in the
Market
Luck & Forecasting Bad Analysis and Unlucky
Understanding of the
Market
Good Analysis Poor Luck Superficial Planning
(Poor Understanding
of the Legislatory
Environment)
Decent Planning Reduced Planning Moderate Analysis
Respectable Company
TABLE 25: Overall: What was or would be the most Important Factor for the
Successful Introduction of the Company
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Company 1 Company 2 Company 3
Forecasting and Luck Continue with Luck
Oligopoly Market
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